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Abstract
We develop a model of competition between retailer chains with a structural estimation of
the demand and supply in the supermarket industry in France. In the model, supermarkets
compete in price and brand o¤er over all food products to attract consumers, in particular
through the share of private labels versus national brands across all their products. Private
labels can serve as a di¤erentiation tool for the retailers in order to soften price competition.
They may a¤ect the marginal costs of all products for the retailer because of eventual quality
di¤erences and also by helping retailers to obtain better conditions from their manufacturers.
Di¤erentiation is taken into account by estimating a discrete-continuous choice model of
demand where outlet choice and total expenditures are determined endogenously. On the
supply side, we consider a simultaneous competition game in brand o¤er and price between
retailers to identify marginal costs. After estimation by simulated maximum likelihood,
the structural estimates allow to simulate the e¤ect on the equilibrium behavior of retailer
chains of a demand shock through an increase in transportation costs for consumers and a
merger between two retailer chains.
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1 Introduction
Private labels (PLs), or store brands, have been growing in importance within the food retailing
industry during the last years. Several explanations can be found to justify why a retailer
may nd protable to introduce a PL in its o¤er. The most common justication in the IO
literature lies in the vertical relationship between manufacturers of National Brands (NBs) and
retailers. In this context, PLs are used by the retailer as a mean to either reduce the double
marginalization problem or to gain some bargaining power in front of manufacturers. The
marketing literature, on the other hand, has stressed the role of PLs as a tool for either better
price discriminate among consumers or for generating consumer loyalty to the store.
All these explanations are in line with statements made by industry managers. Bergès-
Sennou, Bontems and Réquillart (2004) cite a survey by LSA/Fournier1 according to which
the main reasons retailers develop PLs are: to increase customer loyalty (16%), to improve
their positioning (18%), to improve margins (25%) and to lower prices (33%). More direct
conversations with managers reveal that, at least for some retailers, PLs were developed as an
instrument to ght back the entry of Hard Discounters (HDs) in the industry2.
The purpose of this paper is to integrate these considerations in a single framework in order
to better describe how PLs a¤ect the competition between retailers. From their point of view,
private labels play a role both in the demand and in the supply sides. Hence, a complete
evaluation of the impact of PLs in retailer competition needs to take into account both of them.
We will follow the literature on structural models of competition (see, for example, Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Nevo (2001), Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) or Bonnet and Dubois
(2010)) to estimate the parameters of the demand that, together with an assumed equilibrium
condition for the game played by the retailers, will yield estimates for the margins and marginal
costs of each retailer. In order to account for the possible e¤ects of private labels on the supply
side, we will endogenize the location of retailers in the characteristics space dened by the
policy towards PLs. Draganska and Jain (2005) have a similar game of simultaneous price and
product line length competition for the supply side, where the product line is a characteristic
of the market for yogurts analyzed.
The role of private labels on the demand side is two-fold. On the one hand, PLs serve as a
1LSA/Fournier Les marques de distributeurs, Libre Service Actualités, 1472 (January 1996):10-15.
2This is the case, for example, of Leclerc in France who changed its policy towards PLs in 1998 after the
successful entry of Aldi and Lidl to the french market.
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di¤erentiation tool for retailers. In the characteristics approach to product di¤erentiation, each
consumer has an ideal mix of private labels and national brands in the assortment of the retailer.
These ideal points are dispersed along the characteristics space, in which retailers themselves
locate by choosing their policy towards these kinds of products. Consumers with stronger
preferences for PLs will naturally choose to visit those retailers o¤ering a larger assortment of
them. Thus the di¤erentiation aspect of PLs comes into play in retailerscompetition for the
customers. Once the customers are in the store, PLs play a second role of price discrimination
in each of the product lines o¤ered by the retailer. In this case, the private label is an option
that the retailer can use to better screen the willingness to pay of the di¤erent consumers in
its customer base (see Putsis (1997) and Stole (2005)). These two mechanisms also explain
why PLs emerged as a response to the entry of hard discounters: consumers with the lowest
willingness to pay for NBs were attracted by stores o¤ering cheap PL products, reducing the
customer base of the incumbent retailers. Retailers had then the choice between a smaller
customer base but with a higher average willingness to pay - given that entrants provided the
screening device - or keeping the customer base and pursuing themselves the screening through
the introduction of private labels.
To determine whether the development of private labels is an important tool of di¤erentiation
among retailers, we estimate a discrete-continuous choice model for the demand side (following
Haneman (1984) and Smith (2004)) where consumers choose which retailer they patronize and
how much they spend depending on the retailerscharacteristics.
A survey published in a study ordered by the O¢ ce of Fair Trading about competition in
the retailing industry3 identied the principal factors a¤ecting the choice of a grocery store.
Low price was classied in the third place, just behind the product range and selection and
immediately after the quality of the service. The main factor driving the choice was conveni-
ence. This points out a moderate importance of price competition and shows that retailers are
di¤erentiated according to location and product selection. The strategy of the retailers towards
PL products a¤ects this last factor of di¤erentiation, thus raising the possibility that some
features of this strategy contribute to soften even more the competition in prices. Hence, we
estimate the determinants for patronizing a retailer, and the consumers expenditure at it, as
a function of prices, retailers and consumers characteristics. The e¤ect of PLs as a potential
di¤erentiation device is captured through variables reecting each retailers general PLs policy
3O¢ ce of Fair Trading, "Competition in Retailing", Research Paper no 13, September 1993. See section 2.2.3
on Consumer relationhips.
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- the percentage of its o¤er devoted to PL varieties, the number of product lines with a PL
presence and other characteristics. These variables are included in the store characteristics. In
this way, we can estimate their e¤ect on the consumersvaluation of the bundles that can be
purchased at each retailer.
Following Smith (2004) in the functional form chosen for the indirect utility, we carefully
model the heterogeneity of consumer preferences. However, in Smith (2004), retailer prices are
treated as an unobservable in the estimation of the choice model because of the lack of data on
retailer prices, thus instead of inferring marginal costs, Smith (2004) assumes a multi-store Nash
pricing equilibrium on the supply side and uses aggregated data on marginal costs to estimate
the price parameters using the theoretical expression for the prot margins. Our situation is
the opposite, as it is usual in the literature, given the fact that our database is richer and
records the prices of all the products purchased in any retailer, allowing a direct estimation
of the conditional demand elasticity, which is not the case in Smith (2004). In Smith (2004),
unobserved prices a¤ect retailer choice and expenditures and thus both price parameters are not
identied. Instead, identication is achieved by xing the value for the ratio of these parameters
so that it implies a plausible conditional (on retailer choice) demand elasticity.
With the estimates of the discrete-continuous choice model at hand, we can compute the
demand observed by each retailer. Assuming a Nash equilibrium in prices in the game played
by the rms owning the di¤erent retailers chains, we can express the vector of retailersmargins
as a function of demand parameters. From these margins, we can recover each retailers mar-
ginal cost, which reects a combination of all productswholesale prices plus marginal costs of
distribution.
Nevertheless, and also given the particular characteristics of the French retailing sector, it is
interesting to consider competition along more than one dimension. French regulation forbids
the resale at a loss for retailers4: the retailer cannot set the price of the good below the price
appearing on the bill from the supplier. All rebates and reductions, i.e. listing fees, payable at
the end of the year but anticipated by the retailers cannot be deduced from the price appearing
in the bill. Moreover, as general terms of sale have to be non-discriminatory according to
commercial law, the e¤ect of the ban on resale at a loss is equivalent to allowing oor prices:
manufacturers can collude to increase wholesale prices and pay the retailers through negotiated
4Resale at a loss was introduced with the Galland Law in 1996 and mostly unchanged until 2006 while our
data are form 1998-2000. Several studies, including one carried over by the French Competition Authorities,
recognized an inationary e¤ect of the law.
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listing fees (Allain and Chambolle (2005)). As evidence of this phenomenon, Bonnet and Dubois
(2010) have shown empirically that resale price maintenance was used in the market for bottled
water in France during the years 1998-2000. In this case, price competition between retailers is
signicantly restricted and they have to nd other dimensions in which to compete. Competition
along the location in the characteristics space, which in this case is a form of competition in
product lines, arises as a reasonable option. For example, one can think that after a merger the
retailers involved may nd protable to reorganize their o¤ers of PLs and NBs in order to better
discriminate among consumers and reduce competition between them (Gandhi et al. (2005)).
Retailersdecisions on their location in the PLs policy space can also be motivated by the
possible di¤erent e¤ect of national brands or private labels on the wholesale prices o¤ered by
the manufacturers. Literature on the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers
has pointed to two di¤erent ways by which PLs can help to obtain lower wholesale prices on
branded products: when linear pricing is used to set wholesale prices, the introduction of a PL
by the retailer reduces the double-marginalization problem (Mills (1995) and Bontems, Monier
and Réquillart (1999)); if non-linear pricing is used instead, Rey and Vergé (2010) show how
they o¤er the possibility to refuse the contracts proposed by the manufacturers, increasing the
pay-o¤ of non-contracting and thus the rent to retailers.
We thus propose a simultaneous location-and-price game between retailers and assume their
marginal costs to be a function of the mix of national brands and private labels in their assort-
ment. This framework allows to simulate retailersresponse to changes in demand or supply
conditions like a transportation cost shock on consumers or a merger among retailers, and com-
pute their e¤ect on their level of prices and product mix, taking into account the possible e¤ect
on costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature on
private labels. Section 3 presents the formal description of the model of consumer choice of
a retailer and the likelihood function. The di¤erent equilibrium assumptions are discussed in
section 4. Section 5 presents an introduction to the dataset. Section 6 presents the econometric
method and estimation results. Finally, section 7 details the simulation of demand shocks and
merger on equilibrium behavior of retailers.
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2 Review of the literature
Literature on the e¤ects of PLs on competition has analyzed mainly the relationship between
retailers and manufacturers through their branded products (or NBs). According to this stream
of literature, retailers would introduce PLs in order to increase their bargaining power vis à vis
manufacturers.
In a vertical structure with one manufacturer and one retailer, both in a monopoly position,
if only linear prices are considered (Mills (1995), Bontems et al. (1999)), then this structure
su¤ers from the double marginalization problem. In this case, by introducing a PL, the retailer
creates competition in the downstream market which reduces the manufacturers market power.
Consequently, the wholesale price decreases and so does the double marginalization problem.
Consumers surplus rises unless the cost of producing the PL is too high. When non-linear
tari¤s are allowed (Caprice (2000), Rey and Vergé (2010)), the double marginalization problem
disappears, since the wholesale price is set at marginal cost. In this case, the mechanism through
which the retailer gains bargaining power is the reservation prot. Assuming the manufacturer
makes a take-it or leave-it o¤ers, the opportunity to sell a PL creates some prot for the retailer
even if he does not sell the national brand (NB). Thus, for the retailer to accept the o¤er, the
manufacturer must leave some rents to match the retailers reservation prot.
There has been also much interest in determining what is the e¤ect of a PL introduction
on the prices of the NBs. Theoretical works tend to favour the prediction of a decline in NBs
prices whereas empirical works have shown more mixed results. Gabrielsen, Steen and Sørgard
(2001) nd a positive e¤ect (when signicant) of a PL introduction on the prices of NBs. This
e¤ect is larger for high and moderately successful PL introductions and larger on leading brands.
Regarding the e¤ect of PL penetration on individual NB prices per category, Ward et al. (2002)
nd that NB prices tend to rise with PL share and this increase varies within NBs. In some
categories the price increase is much higher in the leading brand and in others it is much
higher in the second or third brands. More recently, Bontemps et al. (2005), using a similar
methodology, show that the positive impact on NB prices is higher for increases in the market
share of PL products stricto sensu. For other kind of PL products - those exclusively sold by
hard discounters or those that are low price products - the e¤ect on NB prices is negative in
half of the categories with signicant e¤ects and, in any case, their e¤ect is lower than that of
strictly PL products.
The other reasons stated for introducing a PL have more to do with the horizontal rela-
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tionships between retailers and have been the subject of less attention in the literature. They
concern the positioning of retailerso¤er and customer loyalty. On the theoretical side, Cor-
stjens and Lal (2000) take this approach and try to "show when and why the store brand can
become a source of store loyalty for the retailer". They show that even when there is no cost
advantage with respect to NBs, retailers may nd protable to introduce a PL with a relat-
ively high perceived quality since it is capable of creating store loyalty. Conversely, low cost
low price PLs only increase price competition between retailers. Basically, a PL works as a
brand that is under exclusive distribution in a single retailer. If there exists a certain level
of brand-loyalty for this PL, this loyalty is directly translated into a retailer-loyalty. This is
then a source of switching costs for the consumers, leading to the usual pricing situations and
trade-o¤s described by Klemperer (1995) of rms facing consumers with switching costs. This
intuition would be in line with the empirical ndings of a raise in NB prices after the introduc-
tion of PL varieties. Moreover, empirical results by Bonfrer and Chintagunta (2004) support
the mechanism explained by Corstjens and Lal (2000). They use a panel of 104 product cat-
egories for ve competing retailers in one region and construct measures of brand loyalty, store
loyalty and store brand purchase. They nd that store loyal consumers are more likely to buy
PL varieties. Higher store loyalty is associated with lower brand loyalty within a store and also
with lower store-invariant measures of brand loyalty. This last correlation suggests that loyal
PL consumers tend to be those with less brand loyalty in general.
Corstjens and Lal (2000) further suggest that consumers loyalty to a retailer should be
even higher when he/she opts for purchasing PLs in more than one category of products.
This argument would call for a positive relationship between the retailers probability of being
selected and the share of PLs in the total expenditure of the consumer at this retailer. However,
reasons in favour of nding the opposite relationship have also been suggested in the literature.
Sudhir and Talukdar (2004) mention the argument that PLs could attract mainly deal prone
consumers and cite the work of Dick et al. (1995) who nd that store brand customers are
more price sensitive than average consumers. Furthermore, if the PL products o¤ered by one
retailer are perfect substitutes for PL products o¤ered by another retailer, then the mechanism
proposed by Corstjens and Lal (2000) for generating retailer-loyalty does not work and the
above mentioned relationship would not exist. Evidence of at least some degree of substitution
is found by Ailawadi and Harlam (2004), who nd that retailersmargins on PLs decrease as
the percentage of competing retailers carrying a PL in the category increases.
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3 Consumer behavior and the demand model
Retailers demand is modeled as a combination of discrete and continuous choices. In every
purchasing act, the individual chooses rst the retailer and then the quantity purchased at
this particular retailer. These decisions depend on consumer and retailer characteristics. In
particular, since the purchasing act of an individual is motivated by the need of several di¤erent
products, the choice of the retailer is going to depend on the prices charged to the di¤erent
products sold. We can simplify this by considering that every retailer o¤ers a particular bundle
of goods at a given price. Then, the choice of a retailer is equivalent to purchase one of the
o¤ered bundles.
More formally, and following Haneman (1984), the individual consumer i has a direct utility
function at time t, u dened over the quantities xit = (xi1t; :::; xiJt) of the bundles goods
proposed by Ji di¤erent retailers, and on the numeraire qit (which will represent the amount
left for top-ups and other purchases in second choice retailers or other minor retailers included
in the database). Ji is the choice set in terms of retailers for each consumer i. The quantity
xijt represents the quantity of the composite good bought by consumer i at retailer j in period
t. The consumers utility also depends on L characteristics of the retailer where the purchase
is made, which will be denoted by b = (b1; :::; bL), and that could vary with the individual
(think of distance to the store for example). Finally, the utility can also be inuenced by
M characteristics of the individual, z = (z1; :::; zM ). The vector  is going to collect all the
characteristics of the retailer and the individual that are unobservable for the econometrician.
At every period t, the individual consumer maximizes his direct utility function u(xit; qit; bijt; zit; ijt)
subject to Ji non-negativity constraints (one for each xijt) and the budget constraint:
JiX
j=1
pjtxijt + qit = yit
where yit is the consumers total expenditure in food and pjt the retail price of store bundle j.
Discreteness in the consumers decision comes from the additional constraint that all but one of
the non-negativity constraints must bind because of the necessarily exclusive consumer choice
of retailer. Given this, the problem reduces to choose the pair (xijt; qit); with the other xilts
set to 0. This maximization yields a demand function xijt(pjt; yit; bijt; zit; ijt) and an indirect
utility function of the form vijt(pjt; yit; bijt; zit; ijt), both conditional on the purchase of the
bundle belonging to the jth retailer. The selection among the di¤erent retailers is made from a
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choice set Ji, dened as the set of all the retailers present less than 16 km away from consumer
i, and it will be given by the following condition:
vijt(pjt; yit; bjt; zit; ijt)  vikt(pjt; yit; bijt; zit; ijt) 8k 2 Ji
The outcome of this selection process is random from the point of view of the econometrician
because of the unobservability of . Therefore, the di¤erent choices will be observed with a
probability induced by the distribution of . The next step in the analysis is to specify a
functional form for the conditional indirect utility function. We use the same functional form
as Smith (2004), which is in turn very close to the one used in Dubin and McFadden (1984)
or Haneman (1984). Treating Roys identity as a partial di¤erential equation, this functional
shape belongs to the class of functions that provides a linear in income conditional expenditure
function. Moreover, we specify the way prices and characteristics a¤ect the indirect utility
function such that the conditional expenditures functions be linear in parameters as in Dubin
and McFadden (1984). The additional restriction put on this class of indirect utility functions
is that it provides also a simple and tractable form for discrete choice probabilities.
Accordingly, the conditional indirect utility function has the following shape:
vijt = 
h

g(i)
2 yit + 
g(i)
1 ln pjt + z
0
it
g(i) +  
g(i)
1jt
i
exp
h
(
g(i)
2h(j)   
g(i)
2 ln pjt)it
i
+  
g(i)
2ijt + ijt
where g identies types of consumers with identical preferences, g(i) is the group type of i,
h(j) is the company group to which retailer j belongs to,  is a scaling term, zit is a vector of
individual characteristics and  g(i)1jt and  
g(i)
2ijt are retailer quality indexes dened as:
 
g(i)
1jt = 
g(i)
1h(j) + b
0
1jt
g(i)
 
g(i)
2ijt = b
0
2ijt
g(i)
The reason for having two di¤erent indices is that some of the retailer characteristics included
in b2ijt - and which may be faced di¤erently by each individual - are not going to inuence the
demanded quantity of the bundle. This specication allows to have an individual-store index
 
g(i)
2ijt that will not a¤ect the conditional demand functions but a¤ect the probabilities of the
consumer of choosing a given store, and a store specic sort of "quality" index  g(i)1jt a¤ecting
the conditional demand of the consumer, including eventually an unobserved component g(i)1h(j)
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which is xed over time. Additionally, g(i)2h(j) is a retailer chain group xed e¤ect capturing
all those xed unobserved characteristics of retailer j that only a¤ect the consumers choice of
retailer but not the conditional expenditure. Heterogeneity in consumer tastes is introduced
by estimating di¤erent sets of parameters g = (g1; 
g
2; 
g; g1h; 
g
2h; 
g; g) for every consumer
type g.
Individuals indirect utility is also a¤ected by unobservable personal characteristics, such as
consumption habits, captured through the univariate random variable it and which is assumed
to follow a log-normal distribution LN(0; g)5. The other source of randomness are unobserved
disturbances to individuals valuation of retailer j at time t, denoted by ijt, and assumed to be
an i.i.d Type-1 Extreme Value distribution function in standard form with unit scale parameter.
In addition, these two random variables are assumed to be independent.
The application of the Roys identity results in the following conditional demand for con-
sumer i at time t for a bundle from retailer j:
xijt =
1
pjt
"

g(i)
2 yit + 
g(i)
1 ln pjt + z
0
it
g(i) +  
g(i)
1jt

it  

g(i)
1

g(i)
2
#
(1)
and multiplying it by its price, we obtain the conditional expenditure:
eijt =


g(i)
2 yit + 
g(i)
1 ln pjt + z
0
it
g(i) +  
g(i)
1jt

it  

g(i)
1

g(i)
2
(2)
From the above expressions, it can be seen that characteristics included in  g(i)2ijt do not
a¤ect the conditional demand and, therefore, the expenditure. These are likely to be retailer
characteristics such as the distance from the consumers home or retailer services like the number
of cashiers. The retailer xed e¤ects capture retailerscharacteristics that are constant through
time like, for example, retailersreputation.
At last, one can also obtain the conditional probability for individual i to choose retailer
j. Actually, given the additivity assumption for ijt on the indirect utility function and the
assumption that ijt follows an extreme value distribution, the probability sijt of retailer j to
be selected by individual i - conditional on the unobserved individual is characteristics it -
5Hence, E [it] = e
g=2 and V ar [it] = e
g

e
g   1

where g = g(i) is the type of consumer i.
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follows a multinomial logit:
sijt (it) =
exp
n

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g(i)
2 yit + 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exp
h
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Then, integrating out over the distribution of population characteristics, we thus obtain the
market shares of each retailer as a function of prices and characteristics of supermarkets. This
aggregated demand function is known by retailers whose competition is modelled in the next
section.
4 The Retailers Game
4.1 Price Competition
We rst assume that retailers compete in prices, taking as given the vector of store character-
istics determined in a previous stage. Thus, the observed prices are those arising from a Nash
equilibrium of a simultaneous price setting game between retailers groups. A single rm can
own several retailers and form a group of retailer chains (i.e. in France, in 2005, the Hyper
2 group owns the hypermarkets of Hyper 2 , the supermarkets of Supermarket 1, some hard-
discount and other proximity retailers). Hence, we assume that prices are chosen by each group
of retailers in order to maximize the joint prots of their members.
Denoting by Jh the set of retailers owned by group h (where h = 1; ::;H and J1, ..,JH is
a partition of f1; ::; Jg), at time t the expected joint prots of group h is the sum of prots
provided by all types of consumers and equal to
P
g
Z

ghdFg (i), where
6
gh =
X
i=g(i)=g
X
j2Jh
(pj   cj) sijxij
In this expression, cj represents the marginal cost of one unit of good sold by retailer j.
Each retailer group maximizes the joint expected prots with respect to all prices of each re-
tail store of the group. Considering all the possible types of consumers, the rst order conditions
6Subscript t is omitted in this section to simplify notations.
11
with respect to prices pj of retail group h can be expressed as:
X
g
Z

@gh
@pj
dFg (i)

= 0 (3)
where
@gh
@pj
=
X
i=g(i)=g
24sijxij + (pj   cj) sij @xij
@pj
+
X
k2Jh
(pk   ck)xik @sik
@pj
35
because @xik@pj = 0 for all k 6= j.
The rst term of the summation measures the extra prots coming from the price increase
over the quantity sold. The second term reects the change in the quantity sold due to the
price increase. This quantity can change through a decrease in the retailers probability of
being selected by the consumer but also through a decrease of the consumers expenditure. The
nal term captures the e¤ect of a change of retailer js prices on the prots of the other retailers
of the group.
Every retailer in group h sets its price level to maximize the sum of the expected prots
derived from each segment of consumers. Thus, the observed price levels must satisfy the system
of J equations formed by the rst-order conditions (3). Once the demand is known, the only
unknowns are the marginal costs cj of each retailer, which can be obtained by solving this
system of equations. To see that, the rst-order conditions can be expressed in matrix notation.
Dene Ih as the ownership diagonal matrix of retail group h, which is of size J  J and
whose elements Ih(j; j) are equal to 1 if retailer j belongs to group h and 0 otherwise. Denote
by ih = diag(Ih) the vector containing the diagonal elements of Ih. Let Sp and Xp be two
J  J matrices containing the sum across consumer types of expected responses of quantity to
a change in prices coming through, respectively, a change in the market share and a change in
the conditional demand, i.e.
Sp 
0BBBBB@
P
g
Z

xi1
@si1
@p1
dFg (i)

   Pg Z

xiJ
@siJ
@p1
dFg (i)

...
. . .
...P
g
Z

xi1
@si1
@pJ
dFg (i)

   Pg Z

xiJ
@siJ
@pJ
dFg (i)

1CCCCCA
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Xp 
0BBBBB@
P
g
Z

si1
@xi1
@p1
dFg (i)

0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0
P
g
Z

siJ
@xiJ
@pJ
dFg (i)

1CCCCCA
Note that the o¤-diagonal elements of Xp are zero due to our formulation of the conditional
demand, which makes it dependent only on the own-price of the retailer. Finally, dene Q as a
diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the expected total quantity sold by each retailer
j: Q(j; j) =
P
g
Z

sijxijdFg (i)

. Then, the margins h  [(pj   cj) 1j2Jh ]j of retailers of
group h (1j2Jh = 1 if j 2 Jh and 0 otherwise) are solution of the following equations:
Qih + (IhXp + IhSpIh) h = 0 8h = 1; ::;H (4)
The solution to this system of equations can be found by minimizing the sum of squares of
condition (4). This yields a solution for h of the form, 8h = 1; ::;H:
h =   (IhXp + IhSpIh) 1Qih (5)
When solving the system of J equations, we obtain an estimate for the marginal cost of each
store bundle of goods. This estimate is of course dependent on the assumption about the game
that is played by the retailers. Were the retailers engaged, for example, in tacit collusion, the
real marginal costs would di¤er from those estimated here.
4.2 Simultaneous Location-and-Price Competition
Suppose now that retailers compete not only in prices but also in their location choice in
the characteristics space of goods, choosing both variables simultaneously. More specically,
retailers can vary their o¤er in PL and NB so as to attract more consumers to the store and,
possibly, increase expenditures. This kind of game implies a second set of rst-order conditions
that adds to the set dened in (3), which allows us to recover more information on the parameters
determining retailersmarginal costs.
Literature on the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers has signaled the
importance of PLs in the outcome of this relationship. When linear pricing is used to set
wholesale prices, the introduction of a PL by the retailer reduces the double-marginalization
problem and allows the retailer to purchase NBs at a lower wholesale price. If non-linear
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pricing is used instead, PLs can be used by the retailers to increase their market power within
the vertical structure. Rey and Vergé (2010) show how they o¤er the possibility to refuse the
contracts proposed by the manufacturers, since retailers can rely on other manufacturers and
on their PLs to conform their o¤er. Moreover, the wider the coverage of PL brands the easier to
refuse contracts that bundle several brands of the manufacturer. Since PLs increase the payo¤
of non-contracting, the manufacturer is obliged to leave a positive rent to the retailer. This
rent depends inversely on the retailers prot on the other brands and can be a¤ected by the
manufacturer through the wholesale price o¤ered to the retailer.
In order to test whether PL brands have a di¤erent impact than NBs on retailersmarginal
costs, we consider that their marginal cost function depends on the ratio in which each type of
brands is present in their assortment. Denote this ratio by j . Therefore, in the simultaneous
location-and-price game, retailers forming the group h solve the following problem:
Max
fpj ;jgj2Jh
X
g
Z

ghdFg (i)


X
g
8<:
Z

X
i=g(i)=g
X
j2Jh
 
pj   cj
 
j

sij (p; )xij
 
pj ; j

dFg (i)
9=;
Each retailer then chooses the level of its j according to its e¤ect on market shares, condi-
tional demands and marginal cost levels. We do not need to impose any functional form for the
relationship between this ratio and the level of marginal costs. Actually, this ratio can a¤ect
marginal costs in two ways: a) it may reduce the marginal cost of the bundle of products by
substituting branded product varieties by PLs that may be purchased at lower wholesale prices;
b) it may reduce the wholesale price for other NBs by increasing the rent that manufacturers
are obliged to leave to the retailer. Note, as well, that the level of marginal costs may depend
on factors that are known for the retailers but unobserved by the econometrician - i.e. the
retailers ability to negotiate contracts or any bargaining power vis a vis manufacturers and
orthogonal to j . Assuming that there is a unique maximum, we use the rst-order conditions
with respect to price which are given by equation (3) and the one with respect to j . Actually,
the maximization with respect to j yields the following additional conditions:
X
g
Z

@gh
@j
dFg (i)

= 0 (6)
where the derivative of retail group hs prots arising from consumers of type g with respect to
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the ratio is given by the following expression, for all j 2 Jh, and h = 1; ::;H
@gh
@j
=
X
i=g(i)=g
24 sijxij @cj
@j
+ (pj   cj) sij @xij
@j
+
X
k2Jh
(pk   ck)xik @sik
@j
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The derivative of marginal cost with respect to j and the margin, of each retailer, are the
unknowns of these equations. As in the previous case, this system of equations can be written
in matrix form. Let  PL be the vector of derivatives of retailersmarginal cost with respect to
j . Dene S and X in the same spirit of Sp and Xp, with the price derivative substituted by
the derivatives with respect to j . Then, the implied derivative of marginal costs is given by
the following expression:
@cj
@j
 
j

= (IhQ)
  (IhX + IhSIh)  for all h = 1; :::;H (7)
in which   denotes the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse (because of the block conguration
of the matrix IhQ) and  =
PH
h=1 h.
Retailersmargins h can be recovered from (4) and substituted in (7). The estimated mar-
gins are the same as in the previous case. The di¤erence is that together with the rst-order
condition on j , they imply a set of estimates for the e¤ect of this ratio on marginal costs. The
sign of this e¤ect is determined by the observed sign of (IhX + IhSIh). Elements in the diag-
onal of the rst matrix contain a weighted sum of the e¤ect of j on the estimated conditional
demand of each consumer, with more weight given to consumers with higher purchase probab-
ilities. The rows of the second matrix contain a weighted sum of its e¤ect on the probability
of selecting retailer j, with more weight given to individuals with higher estimated conditional
demands.
5 Data
Data on consumer and product characteristics, as well as consumersretailer choices are drawn
from a database recording the purchasing acts of french households through the technique of
home scanning7. The database consists of individual purchases made from 1998 to 2000 by more
7The database comes form TNS World Panel and we thank INRA for providing us the data as well as Christine
Boizot for her help in the access to these data.
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than 9000 households8 in french distributors of food products. It covers all the metropolitan
french departements and 476 products belonging to 64 di¤erent food categories (water, aperitifs,
fresh fruits, cheese ...)9. It is representative of the French population.
The database is organized as a collection of product les in which a typical record is a
purchase of that product in a given retailer at a certain date. In this record one has information
about the identifying code of the individual, so that we can trace all the purchases of each
individual, his/her socio-demographic characteristics, as well as characteristics of the product
(brand, price, format ...), quantity purchased and retailer characteristics (name of the retailer,
surface of the store and type of retailer).
Since di¤erent individuals can have di¤erent purchasing habits, and may therefore visit
the stores with a di¤erent frequency, observations belonging to the same month are grouped
together. The choice of the period length as a month is somewhat arbitrary, but it is long enough
to capture di¤erent habits. Moreover, it will be useful in the construction of price indexes that
will avoid short-term variations due to product promotions and enables us to abstract from
other dynamic considerations.
Data on outlet characteristics for every retailer were obtained from LSA/Atlas de la Dis-
tribution 2005, which lists all the french outlets involved in food distribution. Besides their
location, the Atlas provides us with the name of the retailer chain the outlet is a¢ liated to,
its surface, the number of cash registers, the number of employees, the number of parking slots
and the number of pumps available in the outlets gas station. We merged this information
with the household data using the name of the retailer, the zip code of the consumers residence
and the surface of the outlet. For each of the retailer chain, we found the closest outlet to the
consumer dwellings thanks to zip codes and geographical data allowing to compute distances.
If this distance was less than 16 kilometers, the outlet was included in the consumers choice
set. Only one outlet per retailer chain was included in this set. The computed distance is added
as an additional retailer characteristic.
Using the information contained in the household data, several additional variables have been
constructed regarding individualsand retailerscharacteristics (from all the possible retailers,
8The number of households for 1998 is of 9756, that of 1999 is 11310, while the same gure for 2000 is of
12291. Around 1/4 of the panel is renewed every year, thus leaving us with 3710 households present in the whole
period.
9Nevertheless, households do not record all the products purchased. In particular, for each household there
is a group of products not recorded. This group can be either a) fruits and vegetables or b) sh and meat. The
rest of products are recorded for all the households.
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we selected 22 of them representing about a 90% of the total sales recorded in the database).
5.1 Household-specic variables
The data contain detailed information on households characteristics including household com-
position, geographic information on dwellings and also some classication by income groups
that will be used to dene groups of consumer types. The data also contain detailed continuous
observation of all purchases with information on products, brands, prices, retailers.
The data on purchase are aggregated at the household level, by month and we dene the
following variables:
 Monthly expenditure per retailer : All the purchases of a household during a particular
month are aggregated to form his monthly expenditure. Purchases made at the selected
retailers are identied and the rest of the purchases are aggregated into purchases in the
outside option. The rst row of Table 1 presents the average across individuals in the
panel of their total expenditure per month.
 First and second choice retailers: The rst choice retailer is the one where an individual
spent the most in a given month. The same computations have been done for the second
retailer choice. The average monthly expenditure across consumers in rst and second
choice retailers is displayed in Table 1. For each household, expenditure in PL products
in each retailer is also computed. Table 1 also shows the average of this expenditure
across consumers with a positive purchase, of any kind of product, at rst and second
choice retailers.
 Share of PL products in expenditures per retailer: It is the monthly expenditure in PL
products made at a given retailer over the consumers total expenditure at that retailer.
This variable reects the importance of PL products in individualsaverage expenditure
per retailer.
 Loyalty to a retailer in terms of rst choice: This is a dummy variable indicating whether
an individuals rst choice in a given period coincides with his/her rst choice retailer in
the previous period. This variable is shown at the bottom of Table 1.
 Loyalty to a retailer in terms of total expenditures: It is the percentage that the monthly
expenditure spent on a given retailer represents over the total expenditure of the household
across all retailers during that month.
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(in e ) 1998 1999 2000
Monthly expenditure Mean 173.13 170.62 166.89
St. Dev 137.98 144.96 150.46
Monthly expenditure in 1st choice retailer Mean 128.95 128.52 126.23
St. Dev 119.83 129.16 135.67
Monthly expenditure in 2nd choice retailer Mean 41.96 40.92 39.84
St. Dev 36.00 35.21 34.75
PL monthly expenditure in 1st choice retailer Mean 26.95 28.94 29.38
St. Dev 57.56 74.89 83.77
PL monthly expenditure in 2nd choice retailer Mean 10.02 10.54 10.45
St. Dev 14.37 14.59 14.02
Number of visited retailers Mean 2.97 2.95 2.95
St. Dev 1.09 1.09 1.09
Loyalty to rst choice retailer Mean 0.66 0.66 0.64
Table 1: Summary statistics for consumersdata
The data show that the average expenditure in rst-choice retailers is signicantly larger
than in second-choice ones. This suggests that the selection of the rst-choice retailer is the
most relevant decision for the consumer. On the other hand, expenditure in PLs is relatively
more important at second than at rst choice retailers. Finally, around 65% of the households
in the sample chose the same retailer in two consecutive periods.
5.2 Retailer-specic variables
Table 2 shows some statistics at the retailer level over the variables dened as below:
 Sales in PL products: Column (A) displays the retailer specic ratio of sales in PL products
over its total sales (PL penetration).
 First choice probability: Column (B) shows the average probability of choosing a given
retailer as rst choice (in terms of expenditures). This is computed as the number of
households who prefer a given retailer spending the largest part of their food expenditures
in that retailer over the total number of households who purchased some food in a given
period.
 Price index: Column (C) shows a price index computed for every retailer using data on
prices and quantities purchased. Details the construction of this index are given in the
following subsection.
 Share of PL varieties in total o¤er: Column (D) presents the number of PL varieties
(references) o¤ered by the retailer over the total number of varieties o¤ered. The whole
18
o¤er cannot be observed and, instead, both the numerator and the denominator have to
be computed using the records from the household data. The denominator is computed
as the addition of the number of varieties o¤ered for each product in a particular retailer
chain for each period. We aggregate the information coming from outlets with a similar
surface within a retailer: every outlet is assigned into a group according to its surface
in steps of 50 m2. We divide France in 7 large regions and thus the sum is conducted
by retailer, region, group and period. The computation of the numerator is analogous to
that of the denominator but considering only the references identied as PLs. For hard
discounters, this share is dened as hard discount brands over total varieties o¤ered.
 Share of NB varieties in total o¤er: Similar to the previous variable but taking into
account only varieties classied as NB. The total number of varieties o¤ered is not equal
to the sum of the number of PL and NB because of the presence of "First Price" brands
or of "Regional" brands.
 Surface, cash registers, employees, car parking, pumps and number of outlets: Columns
(E) to (J) present the averages across retailers of the variables provided by LSAs Atlas.
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5.3 Price Indices
The computation of a price index is motivated by our denition of utility for a bundle of goods.
We need to assign this bundle a price faced by the consumers when considering whether to
purchase it. The index we compute is a weighted average of the implied prices of the products
included in the database.
Given that for every product we have a sequence of di¤erent brands purchased at di¤erent
prices during the time period, rst of all we have to compute a single price for this product. The
price of a product k is computed, for every selected retailer j in region m (using administrative
"departements") and period t, according to the following expression:
bpkjmt = PN
k
jmt
i=1 p
k
ijmtq
k
ijmtPNkjmt
i=1 q
k
ijmt
where pkijmt is the price of the brand corresponding to the i
th observation in the database,
and that was purchased at retailer j in region m and period t. Similarly, qkijmt represents the
quantity purchased while Nkjmt is the number of varieties of product k for sale at retailer j in
region m and period t: When the price of a product k at retailer j cannot be computed for a
period t due to the lack of data, this price is set to its average value across periods. However,
this problem is not very important, except for two retailers which happen to have a very small
number of outlets.
Once all the product prices are computed, we collapse them in a single measure by computing
a weighted average equal to:
epjmt = X
k
$kbpkjmt
The weight for each product in the index is given by:
$k =
1
Nk
P
i;j;m;t
pkijmtq
k
ijmt
P
k
 
1
Nk
P
i;j;m;t
pkijmtq
k
ijmt
!
where Nk represents the total number of varieties of product k across retailers. That is to say,
the weight is given by the share of the mean expenditure in product k when taking into account
all the observations with respect to the sum of mean expenditures in all the products.
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Other price indexes could be computed following Diewert (1976). In particular, the Fisher
price index is exact for a general translog expenditure function. Since the translog functional
form provides a second order approximation to any general expenditure function, it is considered
a good approximation to the true cost of living price index. The computation of the weights
can also be done in di¤erent ways. Tests will be done to check the robustness of our results to
these di¤erent price indexes.
The use of a price index may also be considered problematic since it may su¤er from en-
dogeneity. By construction, the index takes only into account the prices of those varieties of
products nally purchased by the consumer. However, since we are using averages over all the
consumers in the database, we expect this problem to be small. In a rst stage, and given that
the retailer choice model is estimated using data at the individual level, we will treat the price
index as exogenous and test this assumption later.
6 Identication and Econometric Method
6.1 Estimation method
Given the functional form chosen for the indirect utility and the distribution of ijt, the prob-
ability of retailer j to be selected by household i - conditional on its unobserved characteristics
it - follows a multinomial logit:
sijt (it) =
exp
n

h

g(i)
2 yit + 
g(i)
1 ln pjt + z
0
it
g(i) +  
g(i)
1jt
i
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h
(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2h(j)   
g(i)
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The unconditional probability of individual i selecting retailer j can be found by integrating
out over the distribution of the unobserved individual characteristics:
rijt =
X
g
1
g(i)=g
Z

sijt (it) dFg (it) (8)
where Fg is the cumulative density function of  for type g consumers, assumed to be identically
distributed for all consumers within a type g. As  is assumed log normal, this unobserved
individual characteristic also induces a density of the conditional expenditure, which can be
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found by a change of variable technique:
feijt (eijt j j) =
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(9)
Therefore, the joint probability of observing consumer i spending an amount of eijt in retailer
j at time t is equal to the conditional probability times the marginal probability and is given
by the product of expressions (8) and (9). The likelihood of the sample is given by the following
expression:
ln L =
X
i;j;t
dijt

ln rijt + ln

feijt (eijt j j)
	
where dijt is a dummy variable indicating whether consumer i chose retailer j at time t or not.
6.2 Specication choices
Lets choose the variables entering the di¤erent elements of the indirect utility. In addition to the
household budget attributed to food (yit) and the price of the basket of goods (pjt), variables b1jt
in  g(i)1jt are considered to a¤ect both the choice of a retailer and the conditional expenditure of
the consumer. Among them, retailer-specic characteristics include the logarithm of its surface
(ln surface) and the ratio j of PL varieties to NBs in its assortment. Fixed e¤ects capture
observable and unobservable characteristics of retailers that are constant across households and
time. The most important of these characteristics is the average perception of retailers quality.
zit contains also individual-specic variables such as the number of cars in the household or the
size of the household.
Given the dependence of the estimates of the elasticity of costs with respect to j , it is
important to capture as exibly as possible all the taste variations in the sample. Consumer
taste for j is allowed to vary between consumers along two dimensions. First, consumers may
value di¤erently PL varieties sold at hard discounters than those sold at traditional retailers.
Second, due to the earlier entry of hard discounters in the Northern part of France, preferences
for PLs are allowed to vary also between consumers of the north-west and south-east parts of
France.
The term  g(i)2ijt represents the e¤ect of the variables that may condition the households
choice of a retailer but not his expenditures. We include the distance between the household
and the retailer (distance), the logarithm of the surface of the retailer outlets (ln surface) - this
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is a proxy for the total number of varieties, or the assortment, o¤ered by the retailer at that
outlet - and the number of competing retailers located less than 3 kilometers away from the
consumer.
Finally, a second set of retailer xed e¤ects is included in g(i)2h(j) to capture unobservable
retailer chain characteristics that do not inuence the conditional expenditure of the individual.
As in Smith (2004), the identication of the two sets of xed e¤ects is possible because we
observe both the retailer choice and the expenditure for every individual.
Given the complexity of the model to be estimated and to ease the computational burden,
some restrictions have been added implicitly on the valuation of the alternatives for the con-
sumers by gathering all hard discounters and a minor hypermarket chain into two alternatives
(Hard discounters and Other hypermarkets); the outside option is enlarged with the smallest
supermarkets from Table 2. This formulation assumes that retailers within the grouped altern-
atives are perfect substitutes for each other and that their unobserved characteristics, such as
quality, are equally perceived by the consumers within these two kinds of retailers. Hence, the
two alternatives represent the aggregate competitive pressure that hard discounters and the rest
of the minor hypermarkets put on the remaining retailers.
6.3 Identication issues
Demand parameters are obtained using simulated maximum likelihood (SML). Simulated choice
probabilities are computed averaging the results from 60 random draws taken for every obser-
vation from a log-normal distribution LN(0; g(i)) for it.Convergence of the iteration process
that estimates the g(i) parameters jointly with the rest of demand parameters is hard to obtain
and requires good starting values. However, part of the parameters are already identied with
the conditional expenditure equation (2). In particular, g(i) is identied and can be estimated
by maximum likelihood estimation of this equation. Thus, similarly to Smith (2004), we follow
a three step procedure in which the estimated value of g(i) - obtained after the maximum
likelihood estimation of the conditional expenditure - is then used to dene the distribution
from which the random draws are taken. All other parameters of the discrete-continuous choice
model are then estimated by SML in a second stage. The third step recomputes the value of
g(i) that maximizes the SML at the estimated value of the other parameters in step 2. Steps
2 and 3 are repeated until convergence.
As already mentioned, the identication of this discrete/continuous choice model is achieved
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here with the exclusion restriction that the distances to the retailers a¤ect the choice probabil-
ities of retailers by each consumer but not the conditional expenditure. This is justied by the
fact that we exclude the distance to the retailer to a¤ect the expenditure at that retailer once it
is chosen. Moreover, we consider choice sets for each consumer which depend on the catchment
area (dened using the set of retailer stores present within a given distance to the household
address). These choice sets vary across consumers and we assume that prices and characteristics
of retailers in the choice set vary exogenously with respect to the unobserved consumer taste
distribution conditional on household characteristics like their income group. This amounts to
assume that there is no other heterogeneity of consumer tastes that would be observed by the
retailer when they choose prices.
6.4 Substitution patterns and Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives
Simple logit models su¤er from the property of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA),
which generates proportionate substitution patterns among alternatives. In the present paper,
more exible substitution patterns are obtained by two di¤erent ways.
In the rst place, the model allows for heterogeneity of parameters across consumer types (g).
Hence, the IIA holds for individuals within the same consumer type, but not at the aggregate
level if a su¢ cient number of types is specied. These consumer types are dened in terms of
income. The household database classies individuals in 18 income categories and we further
aggregate those with the smallest number of observations (specially in the lowest and highest
part of the income distribution), reducing the number of di¤erent income categories to 9. This
yields 9 consumer types, although not all of them have enough observations to allow the model
to be estimated. Results are obtained for almost all types with monthly income categories
ranging from less than 305 C= to 4,574 C= .
A second source of exibility is obtained by allowing for taste variation within consumer
types. This is achieved by the interaction of individual and alternativescharacteristics. The
addition of observable individual-specic variables in zit, together with the unobservable it and
the functional form chosen for the indirect utility, provide these interactions. Hence, even at
the consumer type level, the IIA does not hold for the aggregate.
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6.5 Simultaneity bias
The estimation of demand for di¤erentiated products may su¤er from endogeneity problems
analogous to those posed by homogeneous product analysis: producers will set all the control
variables in their maximization problem (price and j , here) taking into account any demand
shocks that they may observe. If these shocks are unobserved by the econometrician, then a
simultaneity bias appears. In the context of di¤erentiated products and discrete choice models,
these shocks are product characteristics (in our case, retailer characteristics) that are unobserv-
able or hardly measurable by the researcher. Among these characteristics, quality stands out
as one of the most important. Other such characteristics proposed in the literature are past
experience (Berry et al. (1995)) or advertising and coupon activity (Besanko et al. (1998)).
To the extent that these characteristics are constant through time, the inclusion of retailer
xed e¤ects in the indirect utility should remove this source of correlation from the error term.
Hence, the coe¢ cients of price and of j would be unbiased. On the other hand, advertising or
promotions can be thought as varying in time. Advertising is likely to be higher during weeks
in which there is a promotion. Nevertheless, our time period being a month, we expect these
two variables to be fairly constant through these aggregated time periods and so their e¤ect to
be captured through the xed e¤ects.
7 Estimation results and simulations
7.1 Empirical estimates of the demand model and margins
Tables 3 and 4 present the results obtained10. Remark that we allow the ratio of private labels to
national brand in the product o¤erings (j) to a¤ect utility di¤erently across two large regions
(the north and northeast of France and the rest of the country) through interactions with
the dummy variable "Northern region" and we also allow this ratio to a¤ect utility di¤erently
between hard discount retailers and "traditional" retailers through the interaction with a dummy
variable for hard discounters. This choice has been the result of a specication search, and
indeed we see from estimates that the o¤er of more private label products (higher j) can
have opposite e¤ects on the utility of consumers depending on their income groups. This taste
10Due to the small market share of Hard discounters among consumers of types 6, 7 and 8, the estimation for
these groups has been performed excluding Hard discounters from the possible alternatives. Also, the estimation
for group 5 failed to converge and hence it is not reported. Remark also that some variables have been removed
from the specication of utility on an empirical basis.
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variation can be interpreted in several ways but reects the fact that private label products can
be perceived di¤erently in the population. Given the functional form chosen for the utility of
the consumer, the interpretation of the coe¢ cients cannot be read directly from the table. The
exception are the coe¢ cients of variables inside  2jt, which enter the utility function linearly.
As expected, distance to the retailer reduces the utility of every alternative. Its e¤ect is less
severe for middle-income consumers, who are more willing to travel. Low-income consumers
may face high transportation costs whereas high-income consumers may value more their time.
The surface of the retailer has a positive e¤ect on the utility for nearly all the income classes,
but less so for the high-income consumers. On the contrary, these consumers have a higher
valuation for the availability of parking slots. With respect to the availability of gas stations,
when signicant, results show that it is positively valued. This is specially true for low and
middle-income consumers. Finally, a higher number of retailers close to the consumer reduces
the mean utility that he derives from each of them.
The estimated parameters also allow to compute the corresponding elasticities that are
presented for each retailer in Table 5.
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Retailer Own-price elasticity Own-price elasticity Own-PL/NB ratio
of choice of conditional demand elasticity of choice
Hyper 1 -10.9759 -1.1482 -0.0022
Hyper 2 -10.9694 -1.1311 -0.0054
Supermarket 1 -11.7135 -1.1464 -0.0037
Hyper EDLP 1 -9.5673 -1.1853 -0.0044
Hyper EDLP 2 -9.1811 -1.1490 -0.0085
Others -11.9909 -1.1716 -0.0061
Other Hyperm. -12.4183 -1.1319 -0.0057
Hard Discount -13.4877 -1.3654 2.4036
Table 5: Elasticities implied by the choice model
Own-price elasticities of expected choices are computed by averaging the simulated price
elasticities of every consumers retailer choice. Own-price elasticities of expected conditional
demand are computed by averaging the simulated price elasticity of consumers demand across
consumers who did their primary shopping at a given retailer j. The expected price elasticities
are thus given by the following expressions:
"cjt =
1
Nj
NjX
i=1
Z

[@sijt () =@ln pjt]
sijt ()
dFg ()
"xjt =
1
Nj
NjX
i=1
Z

[@xijt () =@ln pjt]
xijt ()
dFg ()
where Nj is the number of consumers of retailer j.
Hard discounters have the largest price elasticity of choice, indicating that their customers
are the most willing to switch to competing retailers. Moreover, they also face the largest
price elasticity of conditional demand. Thus, when confronted with a price increase, their
customers react by cutting down on consumption. A di¤erent pattern emerges for Hyper EDLP
1 and Hyper EDLP 2, two retailers who advertise themselves as having lower prices than the
other hypermarkets. Despite facing a higher conditional demand price elasticity, their net
price elasticity (taking into account both the elasticities of the probability of choice and of
the conditional demand) is one of the most inelastic among the selected retailers. Hence, their
customers are relatively loyal to the store but adjust their expenditure in case of a price increase
relatively more than customers in competing retailers. Two other retailers, Hyper 1 and Hyper
2, are in an intermediate situation: their price elasticities are moderate for the selection of
retailer and relatively low for the conditional demand. In other words, they may lose some
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Retailer Margin PL/NB ratio ()
% of sales cost elasticity
Hyper 1 9.00% (0.0072) -0.0183 (0.0042)
Hyper 2 10.40% (0.0045) -0.0165 (0.0029)
Supermarket 1 12.81% (0.0231) -0.0328 (0.0094)
Hyper EDLP 1 9.31% (0.0071) -0.0336 (0.0045)
Hyper EDLP 2 9.79% (0.0047) -0.0288 (0.0031)
Others 10.40% (0.0120) -0.0206 (0.0035)
Other Hyperm. 8.48% (0.0114) -0.0132 (0.0049)
Hard Discount 9.87% (0.0192) 0.9537 (0.3221)
Table 6: Average estimates for margins and elasticities of costs to PL/NB ratio
customers after a price increase but those who stay do not change much their expenditure11.
Elasticities with respect to j are computed in a similar way as price elasticities. Except
for Hard Discounters, all retailers see their choice probabilities marginally decreasing with an
increase of this ratio. The ratio  has the higher e¤ect (in absolute value) for Hyper EDLP 2
and the other small retailers whereas the smaller impact is found for Hyper 1 and Supermarket
1. These ndings seem consistent with consumersperceptions about the quality of PL products
in di¤erent retailers: Hyper 1s PLs are well considered whereas Hyper EDLP 2s are not so
much.
Let us discuss in what follows the margins and derivatives implied by the assumed com-
petition model between retailers. The results summarized in Table 3 are used to construct the
matrices Xp; Sp and Q; which are needed for the computation of the margins  according to the
expression in (5). The averages, across periods and regions, of the implied margins over sales
and ratio-elasticity of costs are presented in Table 6.
Estimated margins are in line with those estimated by Smith (2004) (around 10-13%) for
the British market, whose concentration is similar to that of the French market12. The e¤ect
of  on retailersmarginal cost is estimated to be negative but small in magnitude. Excluding
Hard Discounters, the larger e¤ect on cost (in absolute value) is found for Hyper EDLP 1: a
11Our database does not contain information on purchases done in small retailers - such as street markets and
other small specialized stores - that can be good substitutes of the selected retailers for some consumers. Hence,
our results are conditional on visiting one of these larger retailers and the competitive e¤ect of street markets
and the like is not accounted for.
12According to ACNielsen data, the ve largest retailers in UK hold a market share of 67% in 1999. In France
this gure was around 72%. See Rapport dinformation sur lévolution de la distribution, Assemblée Nationale,
2000.
31
Retailer Original sample Simulated Di¤erence
choice probability choice probability
Hyper 1 14.81% 15.06% 0.25 %
Hyper 2 17.34% 17.67% 0.33 %
Supermarket 1 6.77% 6.95% 0.18 %
Hyper EDLP 1 22.46% 23.01% 0.55 %
Hyper EDLP 2 27.95% 28.64% 0.69 %
Others 6.75% 6.90% 0.15 %
Other Hyperm. 3.72% 3.80% 0.08 %
Hard Discount 3.35% 0 
Table 7: Simulated choice probabilities in the absence of Hard Discounters
1% increase in the PL to NB ratio decreases its marginal costs by a 0.03 %. Hard Discounters
face a cost elasticity closer to unity.
Finally, to provide an indication of the consumerssubstitution patterns between retailers, we
compute their expected choice probabilities in the absence of Hard Discounters. We simulate
the probability each consumer assigns to the retailers in his choice set, excluding the Hard
Discounters, assuming that the rest of the retailers do not change their prices. By the law of
large numbers, the average of these choice probabilities across consumers, computed for every
retailer, converges to the true choice probability they face. Table 7 presents the results of
this simulation. Hyper EDLP 2 and, to a lesser extent, Hyper EDLP 1 would be the two
retailers benetting the most. This nding seems realistic in the view that both retailers are
relatively more specialized in low and middle income consumers and heavily advertise their
"Every Day Low Prices" pricing policy13. Thus, in the absence of Hard Discounters, consumers
would preferably turn to other retailers they perceive as having lower prices. In this case,
this decision implies travelling higher distances, since most part of the consumers would switch
to hypermarkets or large supermarkets located further away. Supermarkets, like Supermarket
1, and other small retailers, although located closer to the consumer, would only take minor
advantage of the absence of Hard Discounters.
7.2 Simulating retailer response to demand shocks
In order to illustrate the applications of our proposed framework, we present in this section a
simulation of the retailersresponse to a demand shock. In particular, we consider the case of an
13See Rapport sur lévolution de la distribution, Assemblée Nationale (2000).
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increase in the transportation cost of all the consumers. Retailers located further away would be
penalized relative to other closer retailers, such as supermarkets and Hard Discounters. In this
case, models assuming only price competition between retailers would predict a price decrease
for hypermarkets in order to retain their more sensitive (to distance) customers. Of course,
if the fraction of distance-sensitive consumers is low enough, retailers may nd protable to
lose these customers and keep (or slightly increase) the level of prices for the rest. However, if
retailers can control, in addition to prices, their location in the characteristics space then the
price decrease may be lower: retailers can compensate the increase in transportation costs by
o¤ering more quantity of the characteristics that are valued by the consumer. Retailers can play
on this degree of di¤erentiation. Of course the trade-o¤ is determined by the costs of changing
these characteristics. In our proposed framework, retailers can control their o¤ering of PLs with
respect to that of NBs and that, in turn, has an e¤ect on their marginal costs.
We implement the increase in transportation costs by simulating a 10% increase in the
distance of the consumer to all the retailers. The exercise amounts to solve the system of
equations formed by the rst order conditions (3) and (6) with respect to prices and j . This
requires the knowledge of the level of marginal costs (j   pj) as well as the value of the cost
derivative along all the domain of the ratio. As our method allows to recover estimates for each
retailer of cj and
@cj
@j
at the observed value j that we denote
\@cj(j)
@j
. We proceed by assuming
that the relationship between marginal costs and the ratio is the same for all the retailers up to
a constant and use the implied values of the derivative to recover a functional form for cj().
The empiricla estimates of
\@cj(j)
@j
show that the derivative of marginal costs with respect to
j is negative for small values of the ratio and positive for larger ones. This implies that the
functional form for marginal costs should be decreasing for small j and increasing afterwards.
One way to reconcile these ndings is by tting a polynomial of order two for the relationship
between the marginal cost derivative and the ratio. Using a quadratic form, we estimate the
parameters b; c; d using
\@cj
 
j

@j
= b+ cj + d
2
j + "j
With the coe¢ cients of this polynomial, we recover the polynomial of order three that char-
acterizes the level of marginal costs. The only unknown is the value of the constant in this
last polynomial, which can be recovered from the di¤erence between the level of marginal costs
cj =
 
j   pj

estimated for each region and period and the value implied by the polyno-
mial. This constant varies across retailers and hence allows for di¤erences in marginal costs
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Retailer Simulated equilibrium Simulated equilibrium Change
(original distance) (10% increase in distance)
Price p Ratio  Price p Ratio  Price p Ratio 
Hyper 1 5.96 1.2552 5.97 1.2606 +0.17 % +0.43 %
Hyper 2 5.96 1.3930 5.96 1.3987 +0.00 % +0.41 %
Supermarket 1 7.13 1.2508 7.24 1.2460 +1.54 % -0.38 %
Hyper EDLP 1 6.23 1.0477 5.88 1.1069 -5.62 % +5.65 %
Hyper EDLP 2 5.62 1.3263 5.62 1.3318 +0.00 % +0.41 %
Others 6.16 1.2143 6.17 1.2309 +0.16 % +1.37 %
Other Hyperm. 6.52 1.2826 6.54 1.2903 +0.31 % +0.60 %
Hard Discount 5.27 2.1698 5.43 2.1940 +3.04 % +1.12 %
Table 8: Retailersreaction to an increase in transportation costs of 10%
irrespective of the ratio of private labels . Thus the cost function per retailer is assumed to be
cj () = aj + b+ c
2
2
+ d
3
3
where aj = cj   bj + c
2j
2 + d
3j
3 .
The simulation is performed using the data for one large region (north and northeastern
part of France) and one period of our sample. Results are given in Table 8.
The rst two columns of Table 8 show the equilibrium price and equilibrium ratio  obtained
when simulating the model without changing any covariates of the model. Comparing these
results with the true data, the simulation shows a better performance in recovering observed
prices than observed ratios. It overestimates the price level of Hyper EDLP 1 and the Hard
discounters, while underestimates the ratio  for Hard discounters. For the rest of the retailers,
the simulated ratio is larger than the observed one but that of Hyper EDLP 1 is relatively too
low.
Besides this rst remark on the performance of the simulation in recovering the observed
data, we nevertheless argue that the comparison of the two simulated equilibria is informative
about the retailersreaction to the demand shock.
In general, the reaction of prices and ratios is small in magnitude. There are, however, a few
exceptions. Retailers located closer to the customer, such as Hard discounters and supermarkets
like Supermarket 1, are able to increase prices between 1.5-3% at the expense of more distant
retailers. This is specially true for Hard Discounters, who can compensate the increase in prices
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Retailer Original equilibrium Merger equilibrium Change
(Hyper 2 and Superm.1)
Price p Ratio  Price p Ratio  Price p Ratio 
Hyper 1 5.96 1.2552 5.96 1.2581 +0.05 % +0.23 %
Hyper 2 5.96 1.3930 5.98 1.3955 +0.34 % +0.18 %
Supermarket 1 7.13 1.2508 7.93 1.1811 +11.24 % -5.57 %
Hyper EDLP 1 6.23 1.0477 6.26 1.0488 +0.49 % +0.11 %
Hyper EDLP 2 5.62 1.3263 5.63 1.3266 +0.21 % +0.02 %
Others 6.16 1.2143 6.16 1.2212 +0.05 % +0.57 %
Other Hyperm. 6.52 1.2826 6.53 1.2830 +0.18 % +0.03 %
Hard Discount 5.27 2.1698 5.26 2.1668 -0.10 % -0.14 %
Table 9: Merger Simulation
with an increase in the ratio of PLs. Among the more distant retailers, those competing for
lower income consumers reduce somewhat both their prices and ratio. This is specially true
in the case of Hyper EDLP 1, who cuts prices signicantly trying to attract more consumers
thanks to its more dense network of stores. The rest of retailers seem to prefer a marginal
increase in prices at the risk of losing their more price sensitive customers.
As a second simulation, we simulate the merger of two retailer chains, the "hypermarket 2"
chain and the chain named "Supermarket 1". This amounts to simulate the new equilibrium
taking into account the fact that the merged entity would maximize total prot of all retailers
of these two chains. Results of the simulation are in Table 9 where the two rst columns
report again the equilibrium simulation at the original situation of the industry structure for
comparison with the merger simulation.
The results show that the largest changes would occur for the prices of the supermarket
1 stores prices which would increase by more than 11% with an important reduction in the
o¤erings of private labels since the ratio  would decrease by 5.57 %. It seems that the merger
would allow the chain to increase prices and reduce the private labels o¤erings. Most other
retailers would also increase prices even if not in large proportion, except hard discounters who
would be decreasing prices slightly.
8 Conclusion
This paper complements the literature on the food retailing industry by developing a structural
model in which retailer chains compete in price and brand o¤er to attract consumers. In
particular, retailersbrand o¤er is characterized by the share of private labels versus national
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brands across all their supplied products. We show that, in general, consumersvaluation of
private labels plays a negative role both in their decision of which retailer to visit and in the
average expenditure at the store. Nevertheless, the inclusion of private labels slightly reduces
marginal costs for the retailer. Hence, the results point out lower marginal costs and a higher
bargaining power with respect to manufacturers as the main motivations for the introduction
of private labels.
Our proposed framework allows for a richer simulation of retailers reaction to changes
in demand or supply conditions. We have shown how some retailers may nd protable to
increase prices while adjusting the ratio of PLs according to the preferences of their consumers.
For example, in the case of a demand shock that could be an increase in transportation cost,
we nd that this increase in spatial di¤erentiation (making stores further from each other and
from customers) allows most retailers to slightly increase prices except some type of less distant
retailers (denoted hyper EDLP 1) who decrease prices but also increase private labels o¤erings
(which allows to reduce cost). On the contrary, hard discounters which are typically the small
and the closest react by increasing prices and private labels. The framework can also be applied
to the analysis of mergers which we illustrate by the merger of two retailer chains. We nd that
not only the merger leads to a price increase of the stores of one of the merged chains but also
to a decrease in the o¤erings of private labels by this chain.
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A Appendix
A.1 Price Index
At rst, all the 476 products were used to construct the index. The resulting price series,
however, presented strong uctuations for some of the retailers. Specially for the supermarkets
Hard Disc. 1, whose price index had a range going from 5,79 e to 11,89 e. A careful inspection
of the data revealed that these retailers had a small number of observations for products with
high variation in prices (crustaceous, oysters, quality wine...). Thus, for data on purchases of
these products, it was possible to have one month with a purchase of a cheap variety and next
moth a purchase of an expensive variety. In order to avoid this problem and to obtain more
stable price indices, we decided to include two selection criteria for the products. The rst one
is about the average number of observations per retailer and period (the number of observations
present for each retailer and period is computed and the average across retailers and periods
is taken). When this number is below a given threshold, the product is eliminated from the
index. The threshold was set at 20 observations after trying with several values. Actually, this
threshold keeps a reasonable number of products while eliminating those with the most severe
e¤ects. Since this criterion still allows for a small number of observations for a single retailer,
we introduced a second criterion. It eliminates those products for which one can obtain a mean
expenditure with a condence interval including negative values for some retailer. Besides these
two criteria, other products were eliminated for several reasons: 11 products were eliminated
because they were not present in all the 36 periods; 1 product was eliminated because it seems
to present wrongly coded information; and nally, 10 products that are normally sold in units
were also eliminated to keep consistency within the quantity variables dened in the rest of the
products. In the end, a total of 240 products were kept to form the index.
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